Ukraine

[malchior]

This report is pretty overblown to me. In the sense that lots of Twitter people want to assign more meaning to it than they should. This probably has minimal impact on this war. This probably affects the newer T-14s that Russia hasn't even really brought to the fight. They are more advanced and require specialty parts.

On balance though, the Russian military has something like 2700 tanks in its arsenal even if they can't build tanks right. Not all are going to be in good state of repair but the idea they can't source/scavenge the parts to be able to repair is not the practical problem they face. They can't reliably transport *anything* forward or backward from operations areas.

[YellowKing]

I'm just having a hard time reconciling that millions of lives are currently at risk in Ukraine, and we're concerned about "antagonizing Russia" at the same time we have essentially declared war on Russia's economy while providing lethal support to the Ukranian militarily that is undeniably and very directly resulting in the deaths of thousands of Russian soldiers.

I found that article I was referring to, and this was one relevant part:

Putin, of course, has an interest in making the West believe that he would be angered by almost any substantive help to Ukraine. Doing so can help maintain Russia’s military advantage. The Biden administration, in turn, would be acting naïvely — and effectively abandoning Ukraine — by taking Putin at his word.

On the other hand, confronting him so aggressively that he fears for his political life could set off a larger war. It could lead Putin to attack a NATO country on Ukraine’s border, like Poland, through which Western weapons are flowing to Ukraine.

There are no easy answers. It is a dilemma out of the Cold War, in which both timidity and aggression carry risks. “Brinkmanship,” Schelling wrote, “is thus the deliberate creation of a recognizable risk of war, a risk that one does not completely control.”

There are some who fear we're acting too aggressively towards Russia, while others believe we're not acting aggressively enough. But there are no good answers because we can't predict what Putin will or won't do. So we play the game as it's been played for decades when dealing with Russia.

[malchior]

Totally agree YK. Aggressiveness here is a balance that can't be perfectly gauged or maintained. But maintain it we will try. Hence why we'll give them guns but balk at directly aiding the transfer of planes. That is a political calculation that is fundamentally one of the President's most important jobs. And the risks that so many are clamoring about are potentially steps towards nuclear war. Not by intention but because the course of war is unpredictable. Accidental escalations happen and you better believe we are working to prevent it when things like this happen.

[raydude]

On balance though, the Russian military has something like 2700 tanks in its arsenal even if they can't build tanks right. Not all are going to be in good state of repair but the idea they can't source/scavenge the parts to be able to repair is not the practical problem they face. They can't reliably transport *anything* forward or backward from operations areas.

Good point. They cannot repair due to logistics issues. Which means damaged vehicles remain damaged. Btw, the same logistics issues will affect the tempo of artillery barrages. The same trucks that supply fuel and food to the troops also supply artillery rounds - which seem to be the current priority. Which would explain the lack of Russian advances. If this artillery tempo slacks off then we'll have a better indication of when their logistics collapses.

[Dogstar]

A rational Putin will accept a deal that looks like Russian victory: control of the two breakaway "republics", recognition of Crimea as Russian, pinky-swear that Ukraine will never join NATO, and the Zelensky government's resignation.

Forget Putin -- I'm hard-pressed to understand why the Ukrainians would accept this deal absent wholesale slaughter of their civilian population or the West threatening to pull sanctions/weapons unless they accept. I know Malchior believes that they don't have the power to dislodge the Russians, and that's probably true. However, they can bleed the Russians -- especially if the initial assessments are correct. If anything, Russia's actions during the invasion, especially with the targeting of civilians, Mariupol, and the potential forced deportation of citizens have hardened Ukrainian resolve significantly.

The resignation of the Zelensky government and the pinky-swear of not agreeing to join NATO are non-starters. Why should Ukraine give up its ability to self-determine its own future? Should they trust on Russia's good word that it totally won't invade again in the future as long as Ukraine doesn't join NATO?

Should Putin/Russia be rewarded by a reduction in sanctions if he's carving off pieces of Ukraine? What kind of message does that send in the future to other aggressors on the world stage that there will be significant pain, but the West will ultimately accept your territorial ambitions a little at a time?

[LawBeefaroni]

(1) Will Putin accept anything less than a complete conquest of Ukraine at this point?

A rational Putin will accept a deal that looks like Russian victory: control of the two breakaway "republics", recognition of Crimea as Russian, pinky-swear that Ukraine will never join NATO, and the Zelensky government's resignation.

IDK if we are facing a rational Putin -- that is, to what extent his yes-men are insulating him from reality, and to what extent he is ready to destroy Ukraine in order to save it. He could be acting rationally on disinformation.

Maybe that looks rational to the Russians but to the Ukranians? They just fought Russia to a stalemate and they're the ones losing territory? I think that's probably a non-starter for them.

It can't be a non-starter. Or more accurately that isn't a sustainable position. They apparently have stopped Russia from achieving it's immediate strategic goals. Great. That unfortunately doesn't mean the Ukrainians likely will have the ability to dislodge the Russians from dug in positions. Or stop the Russians from bombarding their cities.

The problem with giving up the "breakaways" and accepting Crimea is that it leaves Ukraine completely vulnerable to future aggression. Russia intends to landlock Ukraine and depending on the new maps, could do it via a deal. For what? Russian promise to respect their sovereignty? Like they did last time? Any deal that grants Russia significant territory is essentially handing over the whole country in two parts: one now and the next whenever Russia decides to take it.

[Defiant]

Unverified report. Presumably the same lack of component parts will affect the ability to repair damaged Russian tanks.

Russia's only tank tank manufacturer, Uralvagonzavod, has stopped its production. The main reason for this is a lack of component parts.

There's lots of component parts in Ukraine. Maybe they should convert to building tractors that can then go into Ukraine and bring those component parts back so they can build tanks?

[Daehawk]

There's lots of component parts in Ukraine. Maybe they should convert to building tractors that can then go into Ukraine and bring those component parts back so they can build tanks?

Too late. The Ukrainians already have tractors and have started taking the parts.

[Kraken]

A rational Putin will accept a deal that looks like Russian victory: control of the two breakaway "republics", recognition of Crimea as Russian, pinky-swear that Ukraine will never join NATO, and the Zelensky government's resignation.

Forget Putin -- I'm hard-pressed to understand why the Ukrainians would accept this deal absent wholesale slaughter of their civilian population or the West threatening to pull sanctions/weapons unless they accept. I know Malchior believes that they don't have the power to dislodge the Russians, and that's probably true. However, they can bleed the Russians -- especially if the initial assessments are correct. If anything, Russia's actions during the invasion, especially with the targeting of civilians, Mariupol, and the potential forced deportation of citizens have hardened Ukrainian resolve significantly.

The resignation of the Zelensky government and the pinky-swear of not agreeing to join NATO are non-starters. Why should Ukraine give up its ability to self-determine its own future? Should they trust on Russia's good word that it totally won't invade again in the future as long as Ukraine doesn't join NATO?

Should Putin/Russia be rewarded by a reduction in sanctions if he's carving off pieces of Ukraine? What kind of message does that send in the future to other aggressors on the world stage that there will be significant pain, but the West will ultimately accept your territorial ambitions a little at a time?

Kurth asked "Will Putin accept anything less than a complete conquest of Ukraine at this point?", and I believe that what I laid out would let Putin declare victory and stop the attack. I didn't say Ukraine would or should offer it.

[Dogstar]

Kurth asked "Will Putin accept anything less than a complete conquest of Ukraine at this point?", and I believe that what I laid out would let Putin declare victory and stop the attack. I didn't say Ukraine would or should offer it.

That's fair. If that's the bare minimum of what Putin would accept though, it's hard to see how any sort of deal gets done. Ukraine definitely needs to get security arrangements with someone substantial in the future.

[malchior]

Kurth asked "Will Putin accept anything less than a complete conquest of Ukraine at this point?", and I believe that what I laid out would let Putin declare victory and stop the attack. I didn't say Ukraine would or should offer it.

That's fair. If that's the bare minimum of what Putin would accept though, it's hard to see how any sort of deal gets done. Ukraine definitely needs to get security arrangements with someone substantial in the future.

It's not possible. This is why a possible course is Ukraine continues to get eaten up in tiny bites.

[Holman]

This report is pretty overblown to me. In the sense that lots of Twitter people want to assign more meaning to it than they should. This probably has minimal impact on this war. This probably affects the newer T-14s that Russia hasn't even really brought to the fight. They are more advanced and require specialty parts.

On balance though, the Russian military has something like 2700 tanks in its arsenal even if they can't build tanks right. Not all are going to be in good state of repair but the idea they can't source/scavenge the parts to be able to repair is not the practical problem they face. They can't reliably transport *anything* forward or backward from operations areas.

I wouldn't be worried about T-14 tanks. I've seen estimates that number of completed T-14s in the Russian arsenal might be about 20, and possibly as low as zero.

[Kurth]

Kurth asked "Will Putin accept anything less than a complete conquest of Ukraine at this point?", and I believe that what I laid out would let Putin declare victory and stop the attack. I didn't say Ukraine would or should offer it.

That's fair. If that's the bare minimum of what Putin would accept though, it's hard to see how any sort of deal gets done. Ukraine definitely needs to get security arrangements with someone substantial in the future.

I agree. And weren't these Putin's demands from the get go? I feel like if he gets everything he demanded prior to kicking off this war, that sends exactly the wrong message, both to Putin and others watching.

[Defiant]

Ukraine definitely needs to get security arrangements with someone substantial in the future.

From last week:

Ukrainian and Russian negotiators discussed the proposed deal in full for the first time on Monday, said two of the people. The 15-point draft considered that day would involve Kyiv renouncing its ambitions to join Nato and promising not to host foreign military bases or weaponry in exchange for protection from allies such as the US, UK and Turkey, the people said

However, the nature of western guarantees for Ukrainian security — and their acceptability to Moscow — could prove to be a big obstacle to any deal, as could the status of the country’s territories seized by Russia and its proxies in 2014. A 1994 agreement underpinning Ukrainian security failed to prevent the Kremlin’s aggression against its neighbour.

Although Moscow and Kyiv both said they had made progress on the terms of a deal, Ukrainian officials are sceptical Russia’s President Vladimir Putin is fully committed to peace and worry that Moscow could be buying time to regroup its forces and resume its offensive.

https://www.ft.com/content/7b341e46-d37 ... 2b7fa77ef1

[raydude]

What is a Theater Commander and why the Russians probably don't have one.

[Unagi]

I’ve read (and I imagine this is what’s discussed in your link) that the individual fronts are all their own operation and that they are competing with each other for supplies.

It struck me that the Russians are waging war in a similar manner to how our country went about fighting COVID.

[stessier]

I’ve read (and I imagine this is what’s discussed in your link) that the individual fronts are all their own operation and that they are competing with each other for supplies.

It struck me that the Russians are waging war in a similar manner to how our country went about fighting COVID.

His link just comments on how a theater commander is supposed to operate to make everything work. He doesn't really go into why the Russians aren't succeeding other than to say he doesn't think there is a central person coordinating.

I hadn't heard that the different fronts may be competing - that would explain a lot.

[malchior]

I’ve read (and I imagine this is what’s discussed in your link) that the individual fronts are all their own operation and that they are competing with each other for supplies.

It struck me that the Russians are waging war in a similar manner to how our country went about fighting COVID.

His link just comments on how a theater commander is supposed to operate to make everything work. He doesn't really go into why the Russians aren't succeeding other than to say he doesn't think there is a central person coordinating.

My read is that Hertling is specifically arguing why the Russians weren't succeeding. I'd argue what he is doing is pointing at all the things that would be done by a CDR, indicating that they aren't happening, and it is leading to this failure.

[Unagi]

Yeah. I can’t find what I thought I read, and I think it was perhaps a talking head on CNN that was speaking to this point.

They don’t know, but the results on the ground seam to point to it.

Also, it strikes me that if there was an individual that was in this role, Putin may have unleashed his wrath on that individual already and they are no longer in that role.

/shrug.

[malchior]

I mean you can also read in a little chest beating about pointing out the Russian's inferior grasp of what he'd consider the basics of military science. It wouldn't be lost on a man like Hertling that we spent the last 8 years training the staff level in Ukraine and conducting unit level training to turn them into a modern fighting army and Russia isn't performing like one right now despite all their toys.

[malchior]

Another note - I saw chatter about this last night. It turns out it wasn't true but was possible and potentially even imminent. The Ukraine MOD hasn't claimed this AFAIK. It'd probably be cause for Putin to bring the Belarus "reserve" into the fight to rescue them. An entire front of his war collapsing would be inviting a wider disaster.

[Octavious]

How did they cock this up so badly? I do worry that he will just toss a nuke in there once he realizes they aren't going to win. I really don't think he gives two shits if the world blows up.

[dbt1949]

I'm still not so sure Russia is going to lose. They may have to had more troops and use genocide and it will take longer but in the end they will own the Ukraine.

[LawBeefaroni]

How did they cock this up so badly? I do worry that he will just toss a nuke in there once he realizes they aren't going to win. I really don't think he gives two shits if the world blows up.

The question is, what does he care about?

His kids? Doesn't seem like it but possibly. Most likely as his heirs and legacy moreso than actual individuals.

His mistresses/baby mommas? No.

His place in history? Yes.

Russia's place in history? Yes.

His future? Yes but is he terminal? Grappling with his mortality? I don't think so but maybe?

Russia's future? Yes?

It would help to know what he values.


Nonetheless, mutually assured destruction is bad for anything he might care about. The problem is that he may presume that MAD isn't going to happen. US and NATO are certainly making it clear we want no part of it. He may feel he can get away with WMD in Ukraine.

[malchior]

I'm still not so sure Russia is going to lose. They may have to had more troops and use genocide and it will take longer but in the end they will own the Ukraine.

It's possible but they'll have to conjure up a capability that they just demonstrated they do not have at the moment.

[YellowKing]

I still lean towards Putin not wanting to do anything to bring NATO into the fray. He's terrified of NATO, that was the whole point of invading Ukraine in the first place. To create a bit of buffer. Only he thought it would be a quick 2 week war met only with a slap on the wrist. Instead, he's caught in a quagmire and has achieved the exact opposite of his goals.

Of course he's going to threaten nukes. What else does he have to threaten with? A shit army that can't even take over one heavily outmatched country, much less the entire NATO allied military?

I know we can't assume Putin is a rational actor, but I don't see how in any way, shape, or form using nukes accomplishes anything productive. There's no scenario, even from Putin's perspective, that makes their use anything but worse.

Would he use them should he feel NATO is the agressor? Sure, that's a possibility and the reason we've been very careful not to poke the bear. But using them unprovoked? Nah, I don't buy it.

[Dogstar]

I still lean towards Putin not wanting to do anything to bring NATO into the fray. He's terrified of NATO, that was the whole point of invading Ukraine in the first place. To create a bit of buffer. Only he thought it would be a quick 2 week war met only with a slap on the wrist. Instead, he's caught in a quagmire and has achieved the exact opposite of his goals.

Of course he's going to threaten nukes. What else does he have to threaten with? A shit army that can't even take over one heavily outmatched country, much less the entire NATO allied military?

I know we can't assume Putin is a rational actor, but I don't see how in any way, shape, or form using nukes accomplishes anything productive. There's no scenario, even from Putin's perspective, that makes their use anything but worse.

Would he use them should he feel NATO is the agressor? Sure, that's a possibility and the reason we've been very careful not to poke the bear. But using them unprovoked? Nah, I don't buy it.

A contrary point of view that's been offered is that Putin's personal position would become stronger (at this point) even in a loss to NATO because he could paint as a loss to the West trying to crush Russia, as opposed to a long-term quagmire in Ukraine against Slavic brothers and sisters that is bleeding Russia in terms of men and fortune.

[malchior]

Shit in Europe just got more complicated. I don't think many contemplated this and this is actually a reasonably savvy move to counter the sanctions regime.

Edit: There is a probably a decent amount of risk too for Russia here. He is potentially cutting off a source of hard currency that he can use to trade with the Chinese. It does suggest he is feeling some pressure internally since this is a trade off between placating the local populace and having hard currency for external trade.

[Blackhawk]

For the naive, what exactly does that do?

[Unagi]

Strengthens the Ruble

[malchior]

For the naive, what exactly does that do?

NatGas or Oil contracts are almost solely priced in USD or EUR. Futures contracts on those purchases are denominated that way and expected to settle upon delivery in those currencies. He is basically threatening - fuck your contracts - you pay in rubles or you get nothing. It is an attempt to force Europe to poke a deliberate hole in the sanction regime and force central banks in Europe to allow foreign exchange purchases of rubles. That'll create demand for rubles and help to stabilize prices.

As I mentioned above it is a trade off. He was getting cash flows in USD/EUR for gas which was useful for trade with countries not sanctioning or through the banks willing to crime (there are a lot more than there should be) for a piece of the action. He is essentially signaling that the ruble slide is hurting the internal economy enough. My guess is some sort of internal default crisis is going on and perhaps they need rubles at a certain value threshold to avoid some economic disaster. In any case, it is an indicator that the sanctions regime is having some impact.

It also puts a ton of pressure on Europe to figure out how to keep people from freezing or turning off the lights. He is fighting back economically and it threatens to widen the conflict.

[raydude]

I'm still not so sure Russia is going to lose. They may have to had more troops and use genocide and it will take longer but in the end they will own the Ukraine.

It's possible but they'll have to conjure up a capability that they just demonstrated they do not have at the moment.

You need trucks to feed troop reinforcements and refuel the vehicles they ride in. Those trucks are also needed to feed the artillery and missile systems hitting Mariupol. They don't have enough trucks to do both, much less feed and fuel the BTGs they already have in theater.

[Unagi]

I think on balance it’s a mistake.
He’s going to get more hurt by this, as I suspect EU will take the hit some how, and it seems like only a good move if it forced EU to bail/comply/bow out. And I don’t see that.

[Max Peck]

'I'm alive': Former Canadian Forces sniper debunks rumours of his death in Ukraine

A former Canadian Armed Forces sniper now fighting Russian forces in Ukraine says he was the last to learn of his own death.

The former CAF member — who goes by the nom de guerre Wali — told CBC News he returned to a safe location in Ukraine Monday after a week spent battling Russian forces on the front lines in the Kyiv region. When he turned on his phone, he discovered hundreds of urgent messages from people convinced he'd been killed in action.

His wife, father, friends and total strangers sent frantic messages trying to confirm he was still alive. His former commander in Kurdistan, who fought with Wali against ISIS, sent a note saying the community sacrificed a sheep in his honour.

"I'm alive, as you can see," Wali said in a video call Tuesday. "Not a single scratch.

"I'm pretty much the last person to know about my death."

The initial reporting on this guy when he went over to fight in Ukraine was pretty weird. Multiple media outlets seemed to conflate him with just about every Canadian sniper who has been mentioned in the news over the last 20 years or so. It's no wonder the Russians targeted him with a disinformation campaign.

[$iljanus]

I still lean towards Putin not wanting to do anything to bring NATO into the fray. He's terrified of NATO, that was the whole point of invading Ukraine in the first place. To create a bit of buffer. Only he thought it would be a quick 2 week war met only with a slap on the wrist. Instead, he's caught in a quagmire and has achieved the exact opposite of his goals.

Of course he's going to threaten nukes. What else does he have to threaten with? A shit army that can't even take over one heavily outmatched country, much less the entire NATO allied military?

I know we can't assume Putin is a rational actor, but I don't see how in any way, shape, or form using nukes accomplishes anything productive. There's no scenario, even from Putin's perspective, that makes their use anything but worse.

Would he use them should he feel NATO is the agressor? Sure, that's a possibility and the reason we've been very careful not to poke the bear. But using them unprovoked? Nah, I don't buy it.

So there is the "Madman theory" which references Nixon and the cultivation of an "unstable" leader in order to deter confrontation. Putin is probably doing that. But I have a fear that Putin might go away from 20th century concepts regarding the restraint from using nuclear weapons in a conventional war. Why should he be bound by such "outdated thinking"? Here is a man who has invaded parts of Georgia, bombed Chechnya into submission, provided men and materials to the Assad regime in Syria and taken chunks out of Ukraine without any meaningful consequences up to this point. I find that Syria was definitely a lost opportunity to show that the West will not tolerate the use of chemical weapons which like nuclear weapons fall under the WMD classification. So with those metrics in mind, why should a nuclear power rule out the use of chemical weapons on a small scale or even low KT nuclear weapons? I'm not saying that NATO has no resolve in the current conflict but past actions can lead to fatal miscalculations on Putin's part with obvious world wide consequences.

Chemical weapons would probably be the first choice because the West had instituted their red line in Syria and that was essentially meaningless. It would be his way of testing the waters to see how resolved NATO really is.

[Blackhawk]

It seems that this would have been a much better move if it wasn't the middle of spring.

[$iljanus]

It seems that this would have been a much better move if it wasn't the middle of spring.

Yup. The conscription contracts were due to expire in April however and perhaps Putin was also concerned about Ukraine arming themselves along with the arrogance of thinking the Russian war machine was unstoppable.All sorts of irony reading about an invading force not being prepared for the weather in that part of the world.

[Max Peck]

There have been allegations that the invasion was supposed to start earlier, before the spring thaw set in, but that China pressured them to wait until after the Olympics. I don't know whether that has been backed up by any sort of authoritative sources or is just driven by the fact that the invasion kicked off 3 days after the closing ceremonies.

If it's true and the original plan was to sweep in and take the key objectives like Kyiv in a matter of days, then they may have assumed it would be over and done with by the time the ground thawed. There may have been too much momentum and too little flexibility at that point to prolong the delay until after spring when the ground would be dry again. Once all the forces were in place, they'd just be sitting there and consuming supplies while giving Ukraine more and more time to prepare, so they just went ahead and rolled out.

[LawBeefaroni]

I think on balance it’s a mistake.
He’s going to get more hurt by this, as I suspect EU will take the hit some how, and it seems like only a good move if it forced EU to bail/comply/bow out. And I don’t see that.

Timing is bad for Putin. Demand is lower in warmer months. It's certainly more discretionary.

Not that there won't still be demand but it will be easier not to buy.

[malchior]

I think on balance it’s a mistake.
He’s going to get more hurt by this, as I suspect EU will take the hit some how, and it seems like only a good move if it forced EU to bail/comply/bow out. And I don’t see that.

Timing is bad for Putin. Demand is lower in warmer months. It's certainly more discretionary.

Not that there won't still be demand but it will be easier not to buy.

There will still be quite a bit of demand. Approximately 20% and 35% of power generation is nat gas and oil respectively. This gets into keeping the lights on territory. One thing buffering that is it isn't unusual for the fuel source to be substitutable to some extent. Some percentage of power plants are multi-fuel in the US but it isn't close to majority of them. I assume it's similar in Europe. Still I wouldn't want to be anyone in charge of Energy policy in Europe right now.